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Patents and Patients: Who Is the Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Impacting and Who Is Bearing the Cost of High­Priced 
Biotechnological Research?
Caroline A. Crenshaw*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the scientific and medical worlds continue to research 
and  develop  new therapeutic  theories,  drugs,  diagnostics, 
and  treatments,  the  legal  world  must  address  concurrent 
questions stemming from such research and covering issues 
of ownership, privacy, morality, and public policy. One key 
issue  involves  biotechnology  patents,  a  topic  of  not  only 
national  debate,  but  also  the  subject  of  extensive  legal 
literature  and  case  law,  as  well  as  recent  congressional 
action aimed at enacting new patent laws. In the ongoing 
debate, which has focused on the research roles of  major 
universities, large pharmaceutical firms, and small, start-up 
biotech research firms, a group of America’s most important 
medical  research  facilities—private,  non-profit  research 
hospitals, like the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN—have been 
ignored.
These private non-profit research hospitals are hybrids of 
businesses and academic centers and, because of this, they 
are  negatively  impacted  by  patent  laws  in  ways  that 
institutions  which  have  been  the  focus  of  recent  patent 
debates  are  not.  For  example,  pharmaceutical  companies 
make  money—their  sole  focus—through  high-quality 
research and patient test results distributed by the private 
institutions. Start-up firms keep development and research 
costs  down  by  utilizing  the  private  institutions’  research. 
Universities,  which  would  seem  most  analogous  to  the 
private institutions, have fewer financial concerns than the 
non-profit  private  research  centers,  since  they  have  a 
continual  stream  of  revenue  from  state  appropriations, 
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federal grants, and large endowments. In addition, sovereign 
immunity  protects  state  universities  from patent  lawsuits. 
The non-profit private institutions, by contrast, are stuck in 
the middle. These institutions enjoy few research or financial 
advantages, but, through their business arms, must patent 
all of their discoveries to protect themselves, much as any 
pharmaceutical  or  start-up  biotech  company  would.  Most 
importantly,  these  institutions  focus  primarily  on  patient 
care.
Because of the patent problem, private institutions have 
been forced to (1) apply for patents on all of their medical 
research breakthroughs, whether major or minor, preventing 
physicians  and  researchers  from  changing  experimental 
procedures quickly for individual patients; (2) incur costs in 
physician time, legal expenses, and business administration 
to apply for and process patents; (3) incur costs to defend 
against  unwitting  patent  violations;  (4)  incur  costs  of 
monitoring and suing violators of their own patents; and (5) 
pay  high  prices  for  the  use  of  patented  material  not 
developed  in-house.  Meanwhile,  the  Mayo  Clinic  and  its 
counterparts,  for  example  the  Cleveland  Clinic,  ARUP 
Laboratories,  and  Johns  Hopkins  Health  and  Medicine 
Center,1 remain critical to the delivery of medical research 
and patient care in the United States. These private research 
institutions  may  individually  treat  more  than  520,000 
patients  annually2 as  well  as  using  and  developing 
patentable  biotech  processes.3 By  ignoring  the  needs  of 
1
1
. “The Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation (JHHS) is a not-for-
profit organization dedicated to providing the highest quality patient health 
care  in  the  treatment  and  prevention  of  human  illness.”  About  Johns 
Hopkins Medicine, (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
2
2
. See,  e.g.,  MAYO CLINIC,  ANSWERS:  MAYO CLINIC 2006  ANNUAL REPORT,  20 
(2007), available at http://www.mayoclinic.org/annualreport/.
3
3
. Id. at 51. Mayo Clinic invests significant resources in educational 
and research programs:
Overall  funding  for  Mayo  research  and  education programs was 
$634  million  in  2006,  an  increase  of  $67  million  over  2005. 
Government,  foundations  and  industry  sources  provided  $319 
million  of  the  total  amount—a  1.9  percent  increase  over  2005. 
Mayo invested $315 million in research and education in 2006. This 
includes Mayo funds and benefactor gifts.
Mayo  will  continue  to  partner  with  foundations,  benefactors, 
government and industry with mutual aims to support education 
programs that train the next generation of medical professionals 
and  research  programs  that  identify  tomorrow’s  medical 
breakthroughs.
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private research institutions that provide both patient care 
and  develop  and  utilize  emerging  medical  processes  and 
procedures, current patent policy places patients throughout 
the United States, including patients not actually treated at 
the  non-profit  institutions,  at  risk,  since  all  patients 
ultimately  will  incur  the  increased  costs  and  time  delays 
caused by the legalities of medically related patents.
To that  end,  this  Note argues that  non-profit  research 
institutions,  although  they  are  leading  centers  of  medical 
care and therapy development, are fundamentally different 
from other biotechnology research institutions and are being 
overlooked in the current attempts by the courts to interpret 
patent law and the current attempts by Congress to enact 
new laws. The background of this note discusses the history 
of  patent  law;  analyzes  the  debate  over  the  impact  on 
research  of  current  patent  practices  in  biotechnology; 
suggests  reasons  non-profit,  private,  research  institutions 
have been ignored, and reviews current case law and the 
patent  legislation  approved  by  the  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives in the fall of 2007. The Note then analyzes 
whether  the  proposed  “tragedy  of  the  anticommons” 
actually exists, particularly from the perspective of patients 
at  non-profit,  research  institutions,  and  suggests  possible 
reforms and areas for further research that would possibly 
impact  both  congressional  and judicial  decision-making as 
they interpret  patent  law or  enact  new patent  legislation. 
This note concludes that in the narrow sector of non-profit, 
private,  research  hospitals,  it  seems that  current  theories 
and research may not be exhaustive indicators of the entire 
“tragedy  of  the  anticommons”  scenario.  Since  medical 
research and testing is a societal mechanism for advancing 
knowledge, health, and community development, and since 
it  is  unclear  whether  the  increased  use  of  patents  in 
biotechnology is impeding or advancing scientific research, 
the  actual  effect,  as  seen  at  non-profit,  private,  research 
hospitals,  may  be  harm  to  the  patients.  Therefore,  the 
current  use  of  patents  in  biotechnology  needs  to  be 
reassessed,  as  current  practices  are  likely  to  be  against 
public  policy.  A  thorough  understanding  of  the  impact  of 
patents  on  non-profit  institutions  should  enable  Congress 
and the courts to promote effective drug and diagnostic test 
Id.
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development  and  patient  care  without  raising  prices  or 
discouraging  development  in  other  areas  of  biotech 
research.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT USE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Patent  law,  historically,  is  designed  to  protect  society 
from a type of “market failure.”4 To encourage the creation 
and disclosure of inventions, patents protect inventors in a 
market economy from free-riders by “provid[ing] a right to 
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or 
importing the patented invention . . . . Patents also provide 
an  incentive  for  capitalists  to  invest  in  the 
commercialization,  including  the  further  innovation,  of 
patented technology.”5 Ideally, patent law creates incentives 
to  invent,  incentives  to  disclose  and  an  incentive  to 
innovate.6 In  fact,  because  this  capitalist  idea  was 
fundamental  to  the  nation’s  founding,  the  Constitution 
expressly  grants  Congress  the  right  to  protect  these 
incentives:
“The Congress  shall  have  Power  .  .  .  To  promote  the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”7 “By granting inventors 
a  limited  monopoly  over  the  use  of  their  discoveries, 
[generally 20 years from the date of filing,8] patent holders 
will  be able  to  receive  a  return  on  investment  from their 
creations.”9 Title  35  of  the  U.S.  Code  provides  further 
guidance  for  current  patent  law.10 To  be  patented  an 
invention  must  be  novel,  useful,  and  of  a  nonobvious 
nature,11 and  “[i]f  a  defendant  is  found  guilty  of  patent 
infringement in a civil lawsuit . . . the remedies available to 
4
4
. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research 
Tools and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 144 (2004).
5
5
. Id.
6
6
. Id. at 150.
7
7
. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8
8
. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
9
9
. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS AND PATENT LAW 
ISSUES 6 (2005) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter YEH, INFLUENZA].
10
1
. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–376 (2000).
11 . See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–103 (2000).
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the plaintiff include an injunction to cease and prohibit the 
offending activity by the defendant, damages to compensate 
for the infringement, and even attorney fees.”12
A. CONGRESS HELPS PATENTS FLOURISH IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Beginning  in  the  early  1980s,  in  an  effort  to  promote 
medical  research  and  product  development  in 
biotechnology, both the courts and the federal government 
encouraged  privatization  of  medical  research  and  patent 
protection  of  new  discoveries  and  treatment  methods.  In 
1980 the Supreme Court decided in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
that  biotechnological  processes  and  products  are 
patentable.13 Also in 1980 Congress passed the Bayh-Dole 
Act,  which  allowed  universities  and  small  companies  to 
patent and retain the property rights in inventions developed 
using federal funds.14 The passage of this Act increased joint 
ventures  between  the  public  and  the  private  sectors.15 
Consequently, the number of patent filings in biotechnology 
12
1
. YEH, INFLUENZA, supra note 9, at 7 (internal citations omitted).
13 . Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307–09 (1980) (holding that 
a live, human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C.  §  101,  which provides for  issuance of  a  patent  to  a person who 
invents or discovers “any” new or useful “manufacture” or “composition of 
matter”).
14 . See Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-517,  (1980);  Ass’n  of  Univ.  Tech.  Managers,  Bayh-Dole  Act, 
http://www.autm. net/aboutTT/aboutTT_bayhDoleAct.cfm (last visited Nov. 
4, 2007).
[T]he Bayh-Dole Act . . . created a uniform patent policy among the 
many  federal  agencies  that  fund  research,  enabling  small 
businesses and non-profit organizations, including universities, to 
retain  title  to  inventions  made  under  federally-funded  research 
programs.  This  legislation  was  co-sponsored  by  Senators  Birch 
Bayh of Indiana and Robert Dole of Kansas.
Id. See also Mireles, supra note 4, at 155.
15 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 155–56. Discussing the importance of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, Mireles finds that
because the federal government is the largest source of funding for 
research and development in the United States for universities . . . . 
The  government  spends  almost  sixty  percent  of  all  funding  for 
research  and  development  in  universities  in  the  United  States. 
Private industry funds about seventy-six percent of [total] research 
and development in the United States. Prior to the passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act,  less  than four  percent  of  all  government  funded 
research was commercialized.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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industries  resulting  from  these  joint  ventures  flourished.16 
“The  number  of  patent  applications  filed  by  qualifying 
biotechnology  organizations  increased  by  more  than  300 
percent  in  the  first  five  years  after  the  enactment  of  the 
legislation,  as  compared  with  the  five  years  prior  to  the 
passage  of  the  Act.”17 According  to  doctors  at  the  Mayo 
Clinic, the ability of industry to use research generated by 
taxpayer’s  dollars  made  the  “collaborations”  explode,  but 
the physicians also note that at  the same time some key 
technical breakthroughs in molecular biology paved the way 
for  a  flood  of  genetic  discoveries.  The  patent  laws 
encouraged  the  large,  profit-seeking  companies  to  take 
advantage of these new discoveries.18 The sudden influx of 
patents in biotechnology drew attention—both positive and 
negative—and  continues  to  be  debated.19 For  example, 
despite  the  increased  number  of  patents  and  the 
government’s  “power  to  influence  the  affordability  of  the 
resulting  technologies,  it  has  never  used this  authority.”20 
This is problematic because:
under  the  current  system,  new  technologies,  no  matter  how 
marginally effective, come to market at the highest prices. These 
advancing medical technologies are a major cause of rapidly rising 
16
1
. Id. at 156.
17 . Id. at 160–61.
18 . E-mail from Dr. Rebecca F. McClure, Assoc. Dir., Mayo Clinic Dep’ts 
of Anatomic Pathology and Lab. Med. and Pathology, to Caroline Crenshaw, 
J.D. Candidate, Univ. of Minn. (Feb. 7, 2008, 04:54:00 CST ) (on file with 
author).
19 . Yann  Joly,  Open  Source  Approaches  in  Biotechnology:  Utopia 
Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 385, 386 (2007).
The exercise of intellectual property rights in such diverse fields of 
creation as . . . biotechnology has met with intense opposition from 
a growing number of detractors. In the field of biotechnology, the 
critique has become important enough to arouse the attention of a 
number  of  legislative  bodies  and  propel  the  creation  of  an 
important corpus of normative documents.
Id.  (internal  citations  omitted).  But  see Innovation’s  Golden  Goose, 
ECONOMIST,  Dec.  14,  2002,  (Technology  Quarterly),  at  3  (“Together  with 
amendments  in  1984  and  augmentation  in  1986,  this  unlocked  all  the 
inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout 
the United States with the help of taxpayers’ money. More than anything, 
this single policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide 
into industrial irrelevance.”).
20
2
. Merrill Goozner, Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research 
Lead the Way to Affordability?, 3 PLOS MED. 0611, 0611 (2006), available at 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549-1676/3/5/pdf/10.1371_journal
. pmed.0030126-S.pdf.
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health-care  spending  throughout  the  industrial  world.  Second, 
biomedical  innovation  in  the  U.S.,  long  considered  the  global 
leader,  has  slowed  markedly  in  the  past  half  decade.  Despite 
escalating research spending in the public and private sectors, the 
number of new drugs and biologics recently approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has fallen below previous eras. 
. . . And those new therapies that have been approved tend to have 
less significance than medical advances of the past.21
To  address  the  issue  the  House  of  Representatives 
passed  “the  most  comprehensive  patent  reform in  half  a 
century”  on  September  7,  2007.22 The  legislation  will 
supposedly (1) make patents harder to obtain; (2) easier to 
challenge, and (3) curtail litigation by limiting where patent 
owners can file suit (venue) and how much they can collect 
in  damages.23 According  to  one  of  the  legislation’s  co-
sponsors,  Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX),  “Too many patents of 
questionable integrity have been approved, and owners of 
these patents have found a unique way to make money.”24 
While  Congress  passed  this  legislation  to  address  the 
efficacy of the current patent system, the impact of the new 
legislation  might  not  have  the  desired  result.  While 
supporters  of  the  legislation,  primarily  biotech  and 
pharmaceutical  firms,  agree  with  Congressman Smith  and 
argue  that  “[a]  proliferation  of  low-quality  patents, 
skyrocketing litigation costs and potentially ruinous damages 
for patent infringement have . . . combined to undermine the 
foundations  of  inventive-ness,”25 others  caution  against 
sweeping  legislation.26 For  example,  dissenters  note  that 
past reforms led to such major changes as the 1982 creation 
of  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Federal  Circuit,  a  court 
committed solely to intellectual property issues. This led to 
“strengthened  patent  protection,  lowered  the  bar  for 
21
2
. Id. at 611–12.
22 . Catherine  Rampell,  House  Approves  Comprehensive  Patent 
Overhaul, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2007, at D1.
23 . Bloomberg News, House Passes Bill to Curb Suits by Patent Owners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at C4 (The House legislation will limit the damages 
awarded in patent litigation to the value of the specific small item or part 
that was infringed rather than the value of the entire product, which simply 
uses  the  smaller  idea as  one component  in  a  larger  good);  see Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
24 . Bloomberg News, supra note 23, at C4.
25 . Claude Barfield & John E. Calfee,  Congress’s Patent Mistakes,  WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at A18.
26 . Id.
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inventiveness (‘non-obviousness’ in patent-law jargon), and 
paved  the  way  for  large  damages  against  alleged  patent 
infringers.”27 The  centralized  decisions  of  the  new  court 
instinctively  supported  patent  holders.28 Therefore, 
opponents of the House legislation argue that as Congress 
considers reforming patent law,29 “[i]ncremental reform is a 
better idea than radical change.”30
B. “TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS” THEORY
In 1998 Michel Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg31 published 
an article suggesting that the increase of patents might have 
distinct negative consequences on future research opportu-
nities.32 Heller  and  Eisenberg  agree  with  Garrett  Hardin,33 
who popularized the original theory of the “tragedy of the 
commons,”34 which argues that society will overuse common 
resources  because  there  is  no  incentive  to  conserve  the 
resources.35 Yet, Heller and Eisenberg argue that too much 
privatization may be detrimental, rather than beneficial,  in 
27
2
. Id.
28 . See id.
29 . See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong., 
(2d Sess. 2008).
30
3
. Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
31 . “One  motivation  for  patent  reform  is  a  concern  that  the  over-
proliferation of patents, instead of encouraging innovation, is stifling it. This 
argument achieved prominence in an influential 1998 article published in 
Science by two University of Michigan law professors, Michael A. Heller and 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg.” Ronald Bailey,  The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Do Patents Actually Impede Innovation?,  REASONONLINE, Oct. 2, 2007, http:// 
www.reason.com/news/show/122785.html.
32 . Michael  Heller  &  Rebecca  S.  Eisenberg,  Can  Patents  Deter 
Innovation?  The  Anticommons  in  Biomedical  Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 
(1998).
33 . “Trained  as  an  ecologist  and  microbiologist  and  a  Professor  of 
Human Ecology at the University of California for more than thirty years, he 
is best known for his 1968 essay,  ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’” The 
Garrett  Hardin  Society,  http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/  (last  visited 
Nov. 4, 2007).  The phrase, “tragedy of the commons,” derives originally 
from a  comparison  of  medieval  village  land holding  noticed  by  William 
Forster  Lloyd in  his  1833  book  on  population.  WILLIAM FORSTER LLOYD,  TWO 
LECTURES ON THE CHECKS TO POPULATION (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 
1833). The theory itself dates to Thucydides and Aristotle.  William Forster 
Lloyd,  1795–1852,  http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/lloyd.htm  (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
34 . Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 698.
35 . Id.
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the  realm  of  biomedical  research.36 Heller  and  Eisenberg 
posit:
The  tragedy  of  the  anticommons  refers  to  the  more  complex 
obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented 
inputs  to  create  a  single  useful  product.  Each  upstream patent 
allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product 
development,  adding  to  the  cost  and  slowing  the  pace  of 
downstream biomedical innovations.37
In other words, having to spend the time and money to 
buy many different patented elements necessary to create a 
new  drug  or  therapy  inhibits  biomedical  advances  and 
research.  Later  literature  addressed  other  problems  that 
might  result  from  this  proposed  overuse  of  patents.  For 
example, if multiple research tools are necessary in product 
development,  it  might  be  difficult  to  negotiate  a  license 
agreement with each of the patent holders.38 Further, if the 
license agreements include a reach-through provision, which 
allows  the  patent  holder  to  profit  if  the  research  tool 
ultimately  contributes  to  a  successful  final  product,  the 
agreements  might  “erode  profit  potential,  creating  a 
disincentive for companies that require a number of research 
tools to develop specific commercial products or services.”39
As a result of the 1998 Heller and Eisenberg study and 
its progeny, suggesting that privatization needs to be “more 
carefully  deployed  if  it  is  to  serve  the  public  goals  of 
biomedical  research,”40 varying  policies  and theories  have 
attempted  to  find  a  balance  by  encouraging  the 
development of beneficial products and treatments without 
strangling experimental research.
C. THE DOMINANT POLICY ARGUMENTS
Patent protection has encouraged certain developments 
because  patent  holders,  both  public  and  private,  reap 
financial  benefits  for  their  work.41 This  monetary incentive 
36
3
. Id.
37 . Id. at 699.
38 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 165.
39 . See id. at  165  (describing  different  possible  problems  with 
increased patent use, such as blocking patents, complementary patents, 
and increased transaction costs).
40
4
. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 701.
41 . “[P]atents  facilitate  innovation  by  rationalizing  the  allocation  of 
resources necessary to develop a particular invention . . . .Whereas a single 
patent  holder  can  orchestrate  exploitation  of  a  technological  prospect, 
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likely changed the overall dynamic and widely held belief in 
“open  research”  previously  adhered  to  among  research 
institutions,  pharmaceutical  companies,  small  start-up 
groups, and hospitals.42 For example, with guaranteed patent 
protection providing security  for  financial  windfalls  of  new 
discoveries,  venture  capitalist  firms  have  become 
increasingly willing to support small biotech start-up firms.43 
These small,  start-up businesses are arguably fundamental 
for diversity in research, which might be lost without patent 
protection.44 Mayo physicians, on the other hand, note that 
historically this might have been true, when the individuals 
“starting  up”  the  companies  were  actually  the  people 
making the discoveries. Now, though, most start-ups are just 
businesses that make no contribution to the research itself 
and provide no diversity of research. Today’s start-up firms 
tend  to  depend  on  academic  centers  for  expertise  and 
guidance in validation of their products. If they do not, their 
products are usually inadequate and die out.45
Meanwhile,  as  patent  laws  evolved,  universities  and 
private  industry  began  collaborating,  most  likely  because 
pharmaceutical  companies  envisioned  increased  financial 
rewards  in  both  marketing  and  production  of  the  new 
technologies.
The  [pharmaceutical]  companies  do  not  have  the  access  to 
patients and assays required to validate their products. They have 
to collaborate with medical  centers to get the data and medical 
expertise  they  need  to  get  their  products  past  the  regulatory 
agencies  and  to  the  market.  They  have  managed  to  get  the 
expertise for free, because the people they get it from generally 
lack business savvy and the legal support that protects them from 
giving  their  time  and  information  away  for  essentially  nothing. 
Dangle  the  chance  of  publication  in  front  of  researchers  in  an 
academic institution, and they will have their lab employees work 
night and day to generate data for nothing.46
allowing  all  parties  free  access  to  that  prospect  may  produce  ‘chaotic, 
duplication, and wasteful’ effort.” Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and 
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 670 (2004).
42
4
. “These  scholars  observe  a  fundamental  tension  between  the 
proprietary development of end-product pharmaceuticals and the research 
community’s  tradition  of  open,  communal  science.  Privatization  and 
commercialization  ‘threaten  to  undermine  certain  cornerstones  of  our 
scientific infrastructure.’” Id. at 672.
43 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 162–63.
44 . Id. at 157.
45 . McClure, supra note 18.
46 . Id.
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While  universities  might  have  freely  disseminated  the 
information  in  order  to  advance  educational  research, 
privatization insulated them from costly competition, again, 
arguably  encouraging  research  and  innovation.47 Yet, 
patents discourage “the wide sharing of information [which] 
helps to place information in the possession of the people 
who can best use it, even if these people are not the original 
discoverer  or  inventor.”48 As  a  result,  these  collaborative 
efforts  might  be  preventing  the  most  efficient  use  of 
resources.  Again,  the  ultimate  effect  of  increased  patent 
protection in  biotech-nological  research is  unclear,  but,  as 
discussed  below,  the  courts  seem  willing  to  uphold 
traditional patent law in this innovative arena.
D. THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE COURTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENTS
Although Congress may listen to policy arguments and 
amend  legislation  in  efforts  to  remedy  “perceived 
deficiencies,”49 the courts of  the United States also play a 
major role in patent interpretation, litigation and law.
While  the  Supreme Court  has left  the  Federal  Circuit’s  opinions 
undisturbed in the vast majority of patent cases since the creation 
of the specialized patent court in 1982, the Court has shown, over 
the past three terms, an increased willingness to hear cases that 
raise  patent  law  issues.  The  Supreme  Court  Justices’  apparent 
newfound  interest  in  patent  cases  perhaps  stems  from  a 
recognition of the growing importance of intellectual property to 
the  nation’s  informed-based  economy,  as  well  as  the  need  to 
correct  perceived  errors  in  the  lower  courts’  interpretation  and 
application of patent law.50
47
4
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 161–62.
An outside technology transfer firm, a university foundation, or an 
‘in house’ technology transfer office typically do the administration 
and transfer of a university’s property rights . . . . University patent 
policies  often  require  that  the  university  researcher  assign  her 
rights in an invention to the university . . . .  [T]he university  will 
reserve  the  right  to  acquire  title  in  any  invention  the  inventor 
wishes to commercialize.
Id.
48 . Id. at 187; see Lee, supra note 41, at 671 (“[S]tudies debunked the 
popular conception of the solitary scientist toiling alone in his laboratory. 
[Studies]  showed  instead  that  scientists  work  in  communities,  where 
[freely]  sharing information,  theories,  and even materials  fundamentally 
facilitates basic research.”).
49 . BRIAN T.  YEH,  CONG.  RESEARCH SERV.,  AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT U.S.  SUPREME 
COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN PATENT LAW 1 (2007).
50
5
. Id.
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In fact, the Supreme Court, in the past five years, has 
granted  certiorari  in  eight  patent  cases.51 A  few  of  these 
recent patent decisions, combined with earlier rulings, have 
significantly shaped and will  continue to shape patent law 
application in biomedical research, as discussed below.
1. The Utility Requirement
In order to be awarded a patent, the inventor most show, 
among other requirements, that the patent fulfills the utility 
requirement.52 “The  utility  requirement  ensures  that  the 
public receives an invention that is useful in exchange for 
the  limited  right  to  exclude  others  from  practicing  the 
invention. An invention is useful if it performs some function 
of positive benefit to society.”53
Initially,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  in  Brenner  v. 
Manson,54 a case involving a new chemical process, that “a 
patent is  not a hunting license.  It  is  not  a reward for  the 
search,  but  compensation  for  its  successful  conclusion.”55 
51
5
. Id.
52 . “Whoever  invents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,  or any new and useful 
improvement  thereof,  may  obtain  a  patent  therefor,  subject  to  the 
conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C § 101 (2000).
53 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 195.
54 . 383 U.S. 519 (1965).
In  December  1957,  Howard  Ringold  and  George  Rosenkranz 
applied  for  a  patent  on  an  allegedly  novel  process  for  making 
certain  known steroids . . . .  Whatever  weight  is  attached  to  the 
value  of  encouraging  disclosure  and  of  inhibiting  secrecy,  we 
believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in 
the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to 
the  degree  of  specific  utility,  creates  a  monopoly  of  knowledge 
which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. 
Until  the  process  claim  has  been  reduced  to  production  of  a 
product  shown  to  be  useful,  the  metes  and  bounds  of  that 
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a 
vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may 
confer power to block off  whole areas of scientific development, 
without compensating benefit to the public. The basic quid pro quo 
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a 
patent  monopoly  is  the  benefit  derived  by  the  public  from  an 
invention  with  substantial  utility.  Unless  and  until  a  process  is 
refined and developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in 
currently  available  form—there  is  insufficient  justification  for 
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad 
field.
 Id. at 520–35.
55 . Id. at 536.
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However, the Federal Circuit Court in In re Brana stated in a 
biotechnology patent case, “[u]sefulness in patent law, and 
in  particular  in  the  context  of  pharmaceutical  inventions, 
necessarily includes the expectation of further research and 
development. The stage at which an invention in this field 
becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered 
to  humans.”56  The courts  seem to  favor  finding utility  in 
most biotechnology research tools,57 making the patent easy 
to get.
There are other limits on patentability. For example, the 
Patent  Act  states  that  one  who “invents  or  discovers  any 
new  and  useful  process,  machine,  manufacture,  or  any 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof,  may  obtain  a  patent  therefor,  subject  to  the 
conditions  and  requirements  of  this  title.”58 The  Supreme 
Court originally interpreted the Act as limited to processes, 
machines,  manufactures,  and  compositions  of  matter  and 
not  “laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and  abstract 
ideas,” which may not be patented.59 A doctor from Mayo 
points out that,  “If  this  were really  followed,  much of  our 
current biotechnology mess would vanish.”60
In  a  dispute  between  Laboratory  Corporation  and 
Metabolite  Laboratories,  Metabolite  filed  a  patent 
infringement  lawsuit  against  Laboratory,  which  had 
encouraged  doctors  to  administer  a  test  based  on  a 
Laboratory  patent  for  a  research  method  that  correlated 
elevated  levels  of  amino  acid  with  vitamin  deficiencies..61 
The  Federal  Circuit  held  that  Laboratory’s  actions  were  a 
“direct  infringement  of  the  patent.”62 The  Supreme  Court 
granted certiorari to decide the question whether:
[A]  method  patent  setting  forth  an  indefinite,  undescribed,  and 
non-enabling  step  directing  a  party  simply  to  “correlat[e]”  test 
results  can  validly  claim  a  monopoly  over  a  basic  scientific 
relationship  used  in  medical  treatment  such  that  any  doctor 
necessarily  infringes  the  patent  merely  by  thinking  about  the 
relationship after looking at a test result.63
56
5
. In Re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
57 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 201.
58 . 35 U.S.C § 101.
59 . Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
60
6
. McClure, supra note 18.
61 . Id.
62 . Id. at 1364–65.
63 . Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Metabolite Labs v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
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The Court ultimately dismissed the case on a technicality 
and  stated  that  the  writ  of  certiorari  was  “improvidently 
granted.”64 This decision affirmed the infringement liability. 
Justice  Stephen  Breyer  dissented.  “Those  who  engage  in 
medical  research,  who  practice  medicine,  and  who  as 
patients depend upon proper health care, might well benefit 
from this Court’s authoritative answer.”65 He also went on to 
state  that  the  patent  should  not  have  been  validated 
because  “[t]here  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  correlation 
between  homocysteine  and  vitamin  deficiency  .  .  .  is  a 
‘natural  phenomenon’”  that  is  not  patentable.66 Thus,  the 
Court  allowed  for  possibly  low-quality  patents,  which 
Congress is now railing against. Because it can decide what 
constitutes “natural phenomenon,” the Court makes it easier 
to obtain biomedical patents. The problems with this lenient 
definition are amplified in the non-profit sector of medicine:
Although I  am not entirely clear whether the whole genome has 
been  patented  at  this  point,  I  can tell  you  that  every  mutation 
found in every disease today is. This leads to all of the problems 
one could imagine we would have had if Newton had been able to 
patent  gravity.  This  means  that  whoever  holds  the  patent 
essentially  controls  the  entire  United  States  with  respect  to 
anything  done  with  that  gene/mutation.  In  my  world,  where  a 
clinical test for the mutation may be useful or necessary for clinical 
care,  this  can  range  from  licensing/royalty  fees  of  unlimited 
amount  to  excluding anyone or everyone of  the patent  holder’s 
choosing from testing,  to forcing the testing to be done at their 
designated location or with their designated kit, at their designated 
price  for  their  sole  profit.  Not  only  does  this  have  obvious 
implications for the increased cost of medical  care single center 
testing is really dangerous for medical care. All genetic tests are in 
a  constant  state  of  flux  and  require  unlimited  “peer  review”  to 
make  sure  they  are  running  appropriately,  being  interpreted 
appropriately, and open to modifi-cation using better methods over 
time. In almost all instances, the more removed clinical testing is 
from the physicians using it,  the less likely it is  to be optimally 
monitored  and  interpreted.  Many  of  the  tests  used  must  be 
interpreted  in  the  clinical  context  and  in  conjunction  with  other 
tests.  This  can  not  be  done  effectively  by  companies  with  no 
medical  affiliations.  The  mistakes/inconveniences/  waste  that 
accumulate  when  pure  businesses  try  to  monopolize  medical 
testing are costly to all. If we could enforce the Supreme Court’s 
Holdings, 126 S. Ct. 543 (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526.
64
6
. Lab.  Corp.  of  Am.  Holdings v.  Metabolite  Labs,  126 S.  Ct.  2921, 
2921 (2006) (per curiam).
65 . Id. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66 . Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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definition  of  patentability  [limited  to  processes,  machines, 
manufactures, and compositions of matter] we would have a good 
start on the problem.67
2. The Fair Use Exception
Some scholars argue that “specific market failures that 
current patent doctrine does not remedy” could be remedied 
by a fair use exception.68 These scholars argue that fair use 
“could  be  used  to  excuse  infringement  by  researchers 
attempting  to  invent  around  the  patent  even  when  the 
eventual  end  product  is  to  be  marketed  commercially.”69 
While the courts could grant this exception, some academics 
argue that “[t]he expense and time involved in obtaining a 
patent for a non-pioneering, yet patentable invention may 
not be justified if  a broad fair  use defense is  available.”70 
Thus, these academics contend that courts should reject an 
expanded version  of  the  fair  use  doctrine.  This  argument 
should be challenged with regard to the impact of patents on 
private research institutions, particularly since the Supreme 
Court  in  2005 partially  recognized one fair  use exception, 
noting that “The Patent Act’s safe harbor provision has often 
been compared to the ‘fair  use’  defense in copyright law, 
since it immunizes from liability otherwise infringing acts . . . 
to advance compelling public policy interests.”71
The Patent Act’s safe harbor provision was addressed in 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd v. Merck KGaA. The Federal Circuit 
court held that the safe harbor provision (the Hatch-Waxman 
Act)72 for the use of patented inventions reasonably related 
67
6
. McClure, supra note 18.
68 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 202.
69 . Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1238 (2000).
70
7
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 204.
71 . BRIAN T.  YEH,  CONG.  RESEARCH SERV.,  SAFE HARBOR FOR PRECLINICAL USE OF 
PATENTED INVENTIONS IN DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:  MERCK KGAA  V.  INTEGRA  
LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. 3 (2005) [hereinafter YEH, SAFE HARBOR].
72 . 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
The statutory exception was created by the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the 
Hatch-Waxman  Act.  This  legislation  modified  the  Patent  Act  by 
creating  a  new  section  35  U.S.C.  §  271(e),  that  provides  “safe 
harbor”  from  infringement  for  pharmaceutical  companies  using 
patented  invention  in  their  drug  research  and  development 
operations.  The  Hatch-Waxman  act  is  widely  credited  with 
encouraging and expediting the creation and availability of generic 
versions of approved patented drugs.
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to the development and submission of information, applies 
only to the use of  patented material  in  the FDA approval 
process of generic drugs, which should be allowed onto the 
market as soon as the patent on the name brand drug runs 
out.73 To expedite the FDA approval process it is necessary, 
according  to  the  court,  to  allow  this  narrow  research 
exception.74 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously held 
that
[I]t  [is]  apparent  from  the  statutory  text  that  §271(e)(1)’s 
exemption  from  infringement  extends  to  all  uses  of  patented 
inventions  that  are  reasonably  related  to  the  development  and 
submission of any information under the FDCA. . . . This necessarily 
includes  preclinical  studies  of  patented  compounds  that  are 
appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory process. 
There  is  simply  no  room  in  the  statute  for  excluding  certain 
information  from  the  exemption  on  the  basis  of  the  phase  of 
research in which it is developed or the particular submission in 
which it could be included.75
The  Court  then  limited  its  decision  and  followed  the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that the exemption does not include 
all  experimental  activity.  Basic  research  is  unprotected 
unless  the  patented  compound  produces  a  “particular” 
physiological  effect  through  a  “particular”  biological 
process.76
Ultimately,  the  Supreme  Court  failed  to  answer  one 
major question relevant to non-profit institutions. The Court 
refused to decide whether, or to what extent, the exemption 
applies to patented research tools,77 since the matter was 
not at issue in the case.78
YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 2.
73
7
. Integra  Lifesciences,  Ltd.  v.  Merck  KGaA,  331  F.3d  860,  867–68 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Mireles, supra note 4, at 214–16.
74 . Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 866–67.
75 . Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) 
(citations omitted).,
76 . YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 8.
77 . Research  tools  are  defined  as  “tools  that  scientists  use  in  the 
laboratory,  including  cell  lines,  monoclonal  antibodies,  reagents,  animal 
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones 
and  cloning  tools  (such  as  PCR),  methods,  laboratory  equipment  and 
machines.”  Sharing  Biomedical  Research  Resources:  Principles  and 
Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n. 1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
78 . YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 2.
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3. The Experimental Use Exception
Historically,  the  courts  developed  a  common  law 
experimental  use  exception  to  patent  law  infringement.79 
The courts were initially unwilling to punish patent infringers 
for  uses  that  were  “for  the  sole  purpose  of  gratifying  a 
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement”80 
Congress reiterated this general philosophy by enacting the 
statutory  experimental  use  exception,  which  exempted 
patented  materials  which  were  being  used  in  clinical 
research  trials.  This  statute  could  open  the  door  for  an 
expanded  application  of  the  experimental  use  exception. 
However,  two recent  Federal  Circuit  cases  sharply  narrow 
the exception.
First,  the  Federal  Circuit  court  in  Madey  v.  Duke 
University  held  that  the  exception  could  not  be  used  in 
university  research if  there were any possible  commercial 
uses, including simply furthering the universities’ legitimate 
business  interests.81 Thus,  universities  could  be  sued  for 
patent infringement, despite a philanthropic motive behind 
the patent infringement. “The Federal Circuit’s decision can 
contribute  to  the  anticommons  phenomena,  as  university 
researchers  must  either  find  and  license  patents  to  basic 
research tools or risk liability for patent infringement.”82
Further,  while  Duke,  a  private  institution,  may  face 
liability,  many public institutions will  not. “A legal doctrine 
known  as  sovereign  immunity  protects  states  and  state 
institutions  from  legal  liability.  Courts  have  held  that 
participating  in  the  federal  patent  system  doesn’t  cost  a 
state  its  immunity.  The  upshot—states  can  sue,  but 
effectively can’t be sued.”83 Although Congress passed laws 
limiting  the  states’  ability  to  hide  behind  this  shield,  the 
Supreme Court overruled Congress in 1999 and continued to 
protect the states’ immunity from lawsuits “giving states and 
state-sponsored  institutions  protection  from  patent-
infringement lawsuits in federal court.”84 Private institutions, 
79
7
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 205.
80
8
. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.N.Y. 1861) (No. 
11, 279).
81 . See Madey v. Duke, 413 F. Supp. 2d 601 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
82 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 209.
83 . Peter Lattman,  Critics Take Aim at California’s Patent Shield,  WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007 at B1.
84 . Id.
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including non-profits, enjoy no such protection. As the legal 
community and the federal government have attempted to 
balance,  through  patents,  the  uses  and  development  of 
resources,  the  Heller  and  Eisenberg  suggestion  that  in 
biomedical  technology,  “a  proliferation  of  intellectual 
property  rights  upstream  may  be  stifling  life-saving 
innovations  further  downstream in  the  course  of  research 
and product development,”85 continues to be debated. Some 
commentators  appear  to  agree  with  the  court  rulings  in 
these  cases,  stating  “extension  of  the  experimental  use 
exception to include uses of research tools for some or any 
commercial purpose would effectively destroy the market for 
those tools, thus removing any incentives to create research 
tools.”86  Despite the courts’ rulings, the intellectual debate 
regarding  the  actual  impact  of  patents  on  downstream 
research continues.
E. STUDIES ASSESSING THE ACCURACY OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
THEORY IN LIGHT OF CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ACTION
A 2007 study found that the number of biotechnological 
patents per year peaked in 1998, when 5,977 patents were 
issued.87 After  1998  there  was  a  subsequent  decline  and 
leveling  off.88 As  of  2004,  only  4,324  biotechnological 
patents  were  issued.89 Although  one  interpretation  of  this 
trend  might  suggest  that  research  and  technology  is 
suffering, since the number of patents issued is declining, it 
could simply be that the patent office does not possess the 
resources  to  keep  up  with  the  number  of  patent 
applications.90 Or, possibly, the boom in discovery fueled by 
technological  breakthroughs  just  inherently  slowed  as  the 
low lying  fruit  was  picked during  the “boom.”91 The  2007 
study noted that looking at the patent numbers alone does 
not confirm the prophesized harm to biotech research.92 In 
85
8
. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 698.
86 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 214.
87 . David  Adelman  &  Kathryn  L.  DeAngelis,  Patent  Metrics:  The 
Mismeasure  of  Innovation  in  the  Biotech  Patent  Debate,  85  TX.  L.  REV. 
1677, 1687 (2007).
88 . Id.
89 . Id.
90
9
. Id.
91 . McClure, supra note 18.
92 . Adelman & DeAngeli, supra note 87, at 1687.
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addition, a 2002 study conducted by John P. Walsh, found no 
indication that drug discoveries have been impeded by the 
increased  use  of  patents.93 In  fact,  “the  vast  majority  of 
respondents say that there are no cases in which valuable 
research  projects  were  stopped  because  of  intellectual 
property  (IP)  problems  relating  to  research  inputs.”94 The 
study  eventually  concluded  that  research  is  not  inhibited 
because:  (1)  increased  costs  resulting  from  patent 
proliferation  are  not  prohibitive  for  large  firms;  (2) 
universities are often allowed to continue research despite 
possible patent infringement for “educational purposes;” and 
(3) many up-start firms do not worry about patents because 
infringement is hard to detect, expensive to prosecute, and 
often  small  companies  have  few  resources,  making  civil 
litigation for monetary recovery pointless.95
On  the  other  hand,  a  1998  study  conducted  by  the 
National  Institutes  of  Health  (NIH)  suggested  that 
researchers involved in biotechnology are concerned about 
difficulties  and  delays  resulting  from  the  increased 
privatization of “research tools.”96 The NIH study concluded 
that “virtually every firm . . . believed that restricted access 
to research tools is impeding the rapid advance of research 
and  that  the  problem  is  getting  worse.”97 Also,  even  the 
aforementioned Walsh study admitted that  “small-start  up 
firms  and  universities  find  the  licensing  fees  for  research 
tools  prohibitively  expensive .  .  .  and that  there are  non-
economic costs such as publication restrictions for university 
researchers.”98 Again, there is little consensus, but what all 
of the studies ignore is the impact on patients.
Overall,  the  most  frequently  discussed  solutions, 
93
9
. See John  P.  Walsh  et  al.,  Innovation  in  a  Knowledge-Based 
Economy, in PATENTING AND LICENSING OF RESEARCH TOOLS AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION  285 
(Levin & Meyers eds. National Academies Press) (2003).
94 . Id.
95 . Id.
96 . See Mireles, supra note 4, at 145 (explaining the study and defining 
“[a] research tool  [as] a technology that is used by pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies to find, refine or otherwise design and identify a 
potential  product  or  properties  of  a  potential  drug  product,”  such  as 
“fragment of a gene, a gene, ‘cell lines, monoclonal antibodies.’”); NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON 
RESEARCH TOOLS 3  (1998),  available  at http://www.nih.gov/news/ 
researchtools/index.htm.
97 . NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96, at 3.
98 . See Walsh, supra note 93, at 285.
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alternative views, or suggestions to either counter or solve 
the  problem  include:  broadening  the  scope  of  the 
experimental use exception to patent infringement; creating 
a fair use exception to the patent infringement; using patent 
pools;  Congressional  adoption  of  “a  law  similar  to  the 
proposed Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 
2002, which  requires  the  government  to  conduct  a  study 
regarding the effect of government policy on biotechnology 
innovation;”99 creation of  “a publicly available  database of 
proprietary research tools and licenses;”100 focusing on the 
benefits  of an  open  source  approach;101 and  focusing  on 
ulterior effects of patents on paradigm shifts, which furthers 
research  and  development.102 In  light  of  the  downstream 
impact  on  patients,  some  of  these  solutions,  including  a 
narrow  definition  of  what  is  patentable,  should  be 
considered.
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS AFFECTING PUBLIC POLICY 
DECISIONS
A. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED THEORIES
The NIH studies  suggest  that  doctors  and researchers 
are, in fact, worried about delays and costly uses of research 
tools  as  a  result  of  the  reality  of  the  “tragedy  of  the 
anticommons.”103 NIH argues that some research tools, such 
as  the  raw  human  genomic  DNA  sequence  information, 
should not be patentable, reflecting the continued sentiment 
that some scientific knowledge should be openly shared and 
utilized.104 On the other hand, many patent attorneys, the 
writers of the Constitution, and a group of highly regarded 
legal  professors  and  scholars  believe  that  patent  law  is 
fundamental  to inventions and disclosure of information.105 
99
9
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 146.
100
1
. Id. at 147.
101 . Joly, supra note 19, at 386.
102 . Arguably  patents  increase  research  because  patent  law  forces 
scientists  to  think  about  problems  in  a  new  light  rather  than  using 
established  research,  which  might,  ultimately,  be  wrong.  Patents 
encourage innovation in the research industry, thereby enhancing overall 
research. Lee, supra note 41, at 661.
103 . See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96.
104 . Lee, supra note 41, at 677.
105 . Id. at 669; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Professor Peter Lee106 suggests that “[a]rguments both for 
and against patents demonstrate the degree to which legal 
commentators have been preoccupied with relating patents 
to normal progress rather than to the evolution of scientific 
theory.”107 He  suggests  that  “the  argument  that  patents 
actually  deter  scientific  exchange  within  prevailing 
paradigms is important in establishing the larger thesis that 
patents  encourage  the  generation  of  alternate  scientific 
theories  that  drive  paradigm  shifts.”108 Lee  suggests  that 
patents force inventors and researchers to look at scientific 
theories from a new perspective in an effort to invent around 
patented  material,  which  furthers  scientific  invention  by 
forcing  researches  to  avoid  using  the  already  established 
ideas.  This,  in  turn,  promotes  and  generates  downstream 
research.109 Eventually  these “paradigm shifts” will  indeed 
occur  through  the  natural  course  of  research  and 
development. Conversely, though, it seems likely that widely 
available  information  about  successful  research  and 
unsuccessful  research  could  lead  scientists  and  doctors 
down  that  same  “paradigm  shifting”  path,  and  possibly 
sooner  than  if  scientists  are  forced  to  work  in  a  vacuum 
regarding previous successes and failures. Regardless, Lee’s 
work  emphasizes  the  “unique  status  of  research  tools  as 
gateways  to  basic  scientific  research  and  downstream 
development suggest[ing] that patent law should treat them 
differently  than  traditional  end products.”110 Arguably,  the 
courts and Congress might consider addressing the patent 
problem from a new perspective to establish positive policies 
that  are  an  agreeable  compromise  between  patent 
supporters and detractors.111
Unfortunately,  a  compromise  is  difficult  because  both 
sides of the debate are “correct” from certain perspectives. 
For example, as discussed above, small start-up firms need 
funding to perform the expensive work that biotechnology 
research requires. These start-ups focus on niche problems, 
add new ideas, and broaden overall scientific research and 
106
1
. Acting  Prof.  of  Law,  Univ.  of  Cal.  at  Davis,  School  of  Law, 
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/lee.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
107 . Lee, supra note 41, at 669.
108 . See id.
109 . Id.
110 . Id. at 679.
111 . See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
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diversity.112 Since  the  Constitution  protects  innovation  by 
guaranteeing the right to “their respective discoveries” for a 
certain  amount  of  time,”113 the  Constitution  arguably 
protects all types of discoveries in biotechnology, including 
basic  research tools.114 This  fundamental  protection  allows 
small  inventors access to the market and encourages and 
increases  diversity  in  research,115 thereby  providing 
incentives for monetary gain and allowing start-up groups to 
develop funding—just as they are structured to do.116
Pharmaceutical companies, which also are fundamental 
to drug production and development, are similarly protected 
by patent law. For example, important research companies, 
like Pfizer,117 are able to fund unique projects as a result of 
sizeable revenues.118 Pfizer, though, while a cornerstone of 
research and development, is ultimately a corporation and, 
therefore,  profit  driven.119 Consequently,  patent  protection 
and licensing agreements are necessary; they enable Pfizer 
to  insure  that  successful  products  will  be  monetarily 
rewarded. In reality, though, these companies pay little for 
their research while reaping significant financial rewards. For 
example:
A large pharmaceutical company wants to “partner” with us [Mayo] 
112
1
. See Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
113 . U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154 (patents are generally 
protected for 20 years).
114 . See generally Integra Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck KFaA, 545 U.S. 193 
(2005).
115 . See Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
116 . But see McClure, supra note 18, who states,
I  don’t  really  buy  the  data  that  says  the  incentive  of  business 
collaboration drives scientific discovery, at least to the extent it is 
used as an argument for the current system.  In my experience, 
most  scientists  will  discover  whether  there  is  a  business 
opportunity or not, if they are funded to do their work. I think it is a 
very small group that goes into basic research thinking they are 
going  to  make a  big  discovery  and  get  rich.  Most  of  the  great 
discoveries  are  made  by  people  passionate  about  investigation 
with no interest in the business end of their discoveries at all—just 
publication recognition.
117 . Pfizer  represents  “the  world’s  largest  pharmaceutical  research 
effort, which includes more than 13,000 scientists worldwide, supported by 
$7.6  billion  in  funding  during  2006.”  Pfizer:  Science  Policy, 
http://www.pfizer.com/  research/science_policy/science_policy.jsp  (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2007).
118 . Pfizer conducts research in 19 different disease areas, “more than 
any other company,” and made $48.4 billion in revenue in 2006. Id.
119 . Id.
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to develop a therapy and a clinical test to go along with it. Although 
they [the pharmaceutical company] would not disclose much at the 
early stages of negotiations, it sounds like they bought IP from a 
university regarding some genetic markers in a type of lymphoma. 
They are sure “it is a winner.” They do not have the expertise to 
develop and validate a clinical test that will detect these markers 
and be able to be used for  monitoring when therapy (their  new 
drug) is used. They would like us to develop and validate the assay 
for them and get it approved by FDA (provided it gets that far). Our 
business  people  will  negotiate  some  cut  of  the  profits  if  it  is 
successful.  However,  the cost of  all  of  this up to now has been 
entirely funded by the taxpayer, either here or in a foreign country, 
depending  on  where  they  bought  their  IP.  Any  expenses  the 
company incurs from here on out will get passed on in the cost of 
the product. The patent holders can make as much money as they 
want, as they can completely dictate how much everyone pays to 
use  the  test.  But  they  won’t  have  much cost,  because  Mayo  is 
doing the work. Aside from any “cut” in the profits that Mayo might 
negotiate, the main incentive for Mayo to negotiate is to protect 
itself from the costs of running the test for its own patients, should 
the  therapy  be  a  big  success.  We  will  negotiate  some  “more 
reasonable”  fee for  ourselves  to  use  the test  when it  is  on  the 
market (it is never free despite our involvement). So, while Mayo 
will  get  a  break  on  the  cost  of  running  the  test  due  to  our 
“collaboration”, the other big testing centers like us will not. Mayo, 
being non-profit, will pump any money from this back into our R&D 
costs and then we are back to the whole point of why we need so 
much more than others to cover our R&D costs. If the venture is 
not successful, they lose the money they spent on the IP and Mayo 
loses whatever money it spends associated with the effort. Despite 
our best negotiations, we still always feel like the loser, because if 
we don’t negotiate to their liking, they will go to someone else who 
will. We then get a reputation for “not working well with industry” 
and,  despite  the  reality,  patients  and  management  (even  here) 
perceive  that  “working  with  industry”  is  a  good thing and  rank 
medical institutions, in part, by these types of collaborations.120
Finally, under the Bayh-Dole Act, universities are allowed 
to  patent  discoveries  researched  with  federal  funding.121 
Although  university  research  is  historically  aimed  at 
furthering knowledge and education  and is  spurred on by 
intellectual  curiosity—the  reason  government  funding  is 
given to universities—the ability to protect that information 
through  patents  has  led  to  joint  ventures  with  private 
corporations.122 Today private corporations make money by 
leveraging  govern-ment  funds  that  support  research 
120
1
. McClure, supra note 18.
121 . Goozner, supra note 20, at 0611.
122 . Id.
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conducted  at  large  universities.  Universities,  in  return, 
increase their  prestige and attract government funding by 
protecting  and  taking  credit  for  patentable  research.123 
Freely  disseminated  information  via  research  papers  and 
pure  intellectual  curiosity  may  be  lost,124 but  joint 
development efforts can be immensely successful, perhaps 
leading  to  increased,  rather  than  decreased,  downstream 
research.
In  sum,  adherents  of  current  patent  laws  argue  that 
society  not  only  benefits,  but  downstream  research  and 
inventions in biotechnology may continue to develop as a 
result  of  the  patent  laws.  According  to  this  argument, 
patents  do  not  always  pose  a  problem  because 
“pharmaceutical  companies  frequently  exercise  ‘rational 
forbearance’ in deciding not to sue investigators at research 
institutions for patent infringement.”125 The companies might 
not sue, and therefore, the argument continues, the chilling 
effect of  patent violation decreases. Nonetheless, many of 
the likely reasons pharmaceutical companies ignore patent 
infringement—there is no money to be won from small-start 
ups; large state universities have sovereign immunity—fail to 
protect non-profit  research institutions.  While some patent 
violators  may not  suffer,  the large,  well-funded,  non-profit 
institutions,  who  use  a  significant  number  of  patented 
materials every day, can afford to pay and do get sued.
As  the  recent  studies  conducted  by  NIH  show,126 
researchers and doctors believe that downstream research is 
being restricted. Despite the literature that emphasizes the 
importance  of  patents,  it  seems  fairly  clear  that  forcing 
scientists  and  doctors  to  involve  lawyers  and  pay  for  or 
establish  a  licensing  agreement  deters  research.  When 
companies hold patents on procedures and processes that 
are used in multiple tests and in a variety of forms, the ease 
of  research, exploration,  use, and modification of research 
123
1
. “The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act  gives research institutions the primary 
responsibility  for  maximizing  the  health-and-economic-development 
benefits from government research funding.” Id.
124 . “Open development exposes new input to all interested eyes and 
thus  encourages  an  open,  critical  discussion  in  order  to  foster  higher 
quality  research.  In  the  course  of  such  peer  review,  the  contributor’s 
reputation improves by creating useful  solutions and contributing sound 
critical evaluations of the work of others.” Joly, supra note 19, at 398.
125 . See Lee, supra note 41, at 677.
126 . See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96.
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tools is limited.127 It also seems that patent expenses are a 
barrier  to  entry  for  small  researchers  who  cannot  find 
venture  capitalist  funding.128 It  is  clear  that  increased 
protection of patents does, at the very least, drive up costs 
for  researchers  at  all  institutions  and  at  all  stages  of 
research.  In  addtion,  pharmaceutical  companies  obtain 
patents at minimal cost.
The  majority  of  patentable  medical  discoveries  are  made  using 
government/tax  dollar  funding  because  this  type  of  work  is 
inherently costly and inefficient, with much money spent on dead 
ends with only an occasional useful discovery. The bulk of this work 
is done in university centers in the United States. More and more 
discoveries today, though, are made outside the United States and 
paid  for  by  citizens  of  other  countries.  When  the  protections 
provided by a patent are granted to the discoverers to allow them 
to make money on their discovery, they don’t actually pay for the 
costs associated with discovery—the people/patients have already 
paid them through taxes. Since the businesses are only going to 
buy  patents  for  “inventions”  they  think will  make them money, 
they are essentially avoiding almost all discovery costs, which the 
taxpayer is footing. The businesses avoid the real costs of medical 
discovery  by  trolling  for  good  ideas  in  medical  literature  and 
meetings  of  academic  institutions.  They  then  purchase  only 
promising  technology  and  sell  it  at  inflated  prices  back  to  the 
public,  who  both  paid  for  it  and  put  in  the  discovery  effort.  In 
addition, all of the legal fees involved in enforcing their patents get 
billed back to the people/health care system.129
As a result, the non-profit institutions have to make more 
money  to  break  even,  which,  inevitably,  involves  treating 
more patients, charging them more, and/or cutting costs in 
other areas of the hospital.
In sum, though patents do encourage potential monetary 
rewards and continued research and development, they also 
limit research and development by increasing costs for and 
127
1
. For example,
As evidence for a biomedical anticommons, analysts regularly cite 
the  high  profile  case  of  ‘probably  the  most  hated  diagnostics 
company,’  Myriad  Genetics.  In  the  1990s,  Myriad  Genetics 
patented  and developed  a  test  for  variations in the  BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes that greatly increase a woman’s risk of breast and 
ovarian cancer. The company refused to license its patent or test to 
any other company. Thus, clinicians have to send all their samples 
from patients to Myriad Genetics at a cost of $3000 per test. The 
refusal to license means, among other issues, that the test has not 
been validated by other researchers.
Bailey, supra note 31.
128 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
129 . McClure, supra note 18.
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limiting access to information by independent researchers. 
This, in turn, may lead to diminished work quality or no work 
at all.
To  the  extent  non-profit  institutions  are  the  wellspring  of  early 
stage innovation and most of them operate on very tight research 
budgets,  any  roadblocks  to  the  easy  access  to  research  tools, 
whether they involve money or time or, perhaps most significantly, 
intellectual collaboration, can serve to retard innovation. That said, 
the number of documented instances are few, since it is a classic 
case of proving the negative. How can you quantify what hasn’t 
happened?130
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is, 
to some degree, a “tragedy of the anticommons,” but that 
patents, as set forth in the Constitution, remain fundamental 
to research and development.
B. THE IMPACT ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH OF CURRENT LEGISLATION AND 
LITIGATION
In an effort to recognize the problems arising under the 
current patent system while at the same time recognizing 
the importance of patent law, in the fall of 2007 Congress 
decided  to  act.131 “High  patent  quality  is  essential  to 
continued  innovation.  Litigation  abuses,  especially  ones 
committed  by  those  who  thrive  on  low  quality  patents, 
impede the promotion  of  the progress  of  science and the 
useful  arts.  Thus,  we  must  act  quickly  during  the  110th 
Congress to maintain the integrity of the patent system.”132 
The  legislation  would  impact  patent  litigation  through  a 
variety  of  changes,  including  available  damages,  venue 
requirements,  interlocutory  appeals,  and  best  mode 
requirements.133 It  would  reform  the  patent  office  by 
130
1
. E-mail from Merril Goozner, Dir., Integrity in Sci., Ctr. for Sci. in the 
Pub. Interest, to Caroline Crenshaw, J.D. Candidate, Univ. of Minn. (Jan. 9, 
2008, 11:49:00 EST) (on file with author).
131 . Bloomberg News, supra note 23.
132 . Statement of Representative Howard L. Berman of California on The 
Patent Reform Act of April 18, 2007, http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca28_ 
berman/statement_berman_patent.doc (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
133 . See Patent  Reform Act  of  2007,  H.R.  1908,  110th Cong. (2007). 
Note: The House approved H.R. 1908 on Sept. 7, 2007, but in April, 2008, 
the  key  Senate  sponsor,  Senator  Patrick  Leahy  (D-VT)  declared  the 
legislation “dead” for  the 110th Congress.  Eileen McDermott,  End of the 
Road  for  US  Patent  Reform  Bill,  MANAGING INTELL.  PROP.,  May  12,  2008, 
available at http://www. managingip.com/Article/1930563/End-of-the-road-
for-US-patent-reform-bill. html. 
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awarding patents to the inventor that files first, rather than 
the  first  inventor,  and  by  allowing  third  party  review  of 
patent applications.134
The House  Bill  and  the  Senate  Bill  diverge,  though,135 
highlighting the lack of  consensus regarding how to solve 
the current patent debate.136 Although the House considered 
industry  groups’  perspectives,  137 the  legislation  remains 
contentious.  For  example,  the  Biotechnology  Industry 
Organi-zation (BIO)138 approved some recent changes, but, 
believing  the  damages  provision  will  deter  innovation, 
refuses to support the bill.139
While the proposed legislative changes seem necessary 
and,  indeed,  may improve the current patent  system,  the 
134
1
. Id.
135 . See Kathi  Lutton  & Kelly  Hunsaker,  Patent  Reform Act  of  2007: 
House  Bill  Passes!,  FISH AND RICHARDSON PATENT REFORM UPDATE (Sep.  7, 
2007),available  at http://www.fr.com/news/2007/Sept/Patent%20Reform
%20  Pres%20Sept%2007.pdf  (describing  the  differences  between  the 
House and Senate versions of the patent reform act).
136 . “It’s not a perfect solution. This bill is the beginning of a process. I 
am open to suggestions for amending the language to improve its efficacy 
or  rectify  any  unintended  consequences.”  Statement  of  Rep.  Berman, 
supra note 132.
137 . See id. (listing industry groups involved as well as various proposals 
and suggestions presented to Congress).
138 .
BIO  represents  more  than  1,100  biotechnology  companies, 
academic  institutions,  state  biotechnology  centers,  and  related 
organizations across the United States and 31 other nations. BIO 
members  are  involved  in  the  research  and  development  of 
healthcare,  agricultural,  industrial  and  environmental 
biotechnology  products.  BIO  also  produces  the  annual  BIO 
International Convention, the global event for biotechnology.
Statement  of  Jim  Greenwood,  BIO  president  and  CEO,  Bio  Expresses 
Concern with Patent Reform Legislation As Reported out of House Judiciary 
Committee (July  19,  2007)  http://bio.org/news/newsitem.asp?
id=2007_0719_01 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
139 .We  remain  concerned,  however,  with  provisions  in  the 
legislation  that  would  change  how  damages  against  patent 
infringers  are  calculated,  in  a  way  that  would  often  make 
infringement cheaper.  We also believe changes are required to the 
provision  that  would  require  that  courts  peel  away  from  the 
patented and infringed invention the value of all previously known 
elements  and  award  damages  based  solely  on  the  remaining 
elements.  This provision severely devalues all  underlying patent 
rights  and  could  seriously  undermine  the  incentive  to  develop 
novel new forms of medicines and other biotechnologies.  Further, 
the bill continues to contain broad new rulemaking authority for the 
PTO, which is of great concern to BIO.
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impact  on  biotechnology  is  unclear.140 Increased  difficulty 
obtaining patents and third party review might increase the 
cost  and  length  of  the  process  itself,  thereby  failing  to 
reduce  the  cost  of  obtaining  and  licensing  patents  for 
“downstream”  research.  The  limited  damages  provision 
might  forestall  litigation,  increasing  the  use  of  patented 
material downstream, but that might increase the ability to 
infringe  upon  legitimate  patents.  In  light  of  the  uncertain 
impact of legislation on patents in biotechnology, legislators 
must consider, and the courts must interpret, all current and 
future legislation in light of public policy considerations.141 It 
would be prudent to focus on the measure’s over-all impact 
on medicine and patients, rather than narrow input to the 
views  of  IP  lawyers  and  pharmaceutical  CEOs,  who  have 
“vociferously  argued  that  their  ability  to  compete 
internationally  depends  on  the  full  panoply  of  current 
intellectual property rights.”142 One key to such focus is the 
plight of the private, non-profit, research institutions. These 
clinics—a  crucial  subset  of  the  nation’s  medical  research 
community,  treating  the  general  public,  legislators, 
attorneys, and foreign dignitaries—are neither quintessential 
businesses  nor  purely  charitable  foundations.  Rather,  as 
discussed below in subsection D(1) their structure could be 
termed quasi-business.143 If the patent problem is solved for 
the  non-profit  institutions,  which  develop  innovative 
technology through their own research efforts, Congress and 
the  courts  will  likely  have  found  a  balance  among  the 
business, the science, and the medical interests subject to 
biotech patent law.
C. ANALYSIS OF NON-PROFITS MIGHT IMPACT PUBLIC POLICY, LEGISLATION, AND 
LITIGATION.
To find a solution to the impasse, lawyers, researchers, 
courts  and  legislatures  should,  as  Peter  Lee  did,  think 
“outside  the  box.”  In  terms  of  medical  research,  the 
overarching purpose of developing new gene therapies and 
new drugs is to serve patients’ needs. In the discussion of 
Id.
140
1
. See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
141 . Id.
142 . Id.
143 . McClure, supra note 18.
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the “tragedy of the anticommons” in biotech patent law, the 
patient is  forgotten.144 The focus aims solely at  increasing 
the  research  quantitatively.145 Encouraging  research, 
although  an  important  public  policy  concern,  does  not 
outweigh the needs of  the doctors  and patients,  although 
some legal  experts  do not  believe patients  are  the major 
concern.146 However, when a product affects a sick or dying 
person, rather than a retail consumer or a widget, additional 
factors  should  be  considered  in  legislation  and  court 
review.147 Congress and the courts should consider that:
In healthcare, physicians are required to treat patients based on 
“standard of care,” which usually means providing the latest and 
best medicine. This may mean employing something that is already 
available  or  something  that  has  just  recently  appeared  in  the 
literature as possibly useful. Neither the physician nor the patient 
really has any choice in this.  This lack of choice is due to many 
factors,  including  our  culture  of  (good  quality)  life  at  all  cost, 
malpractice  litigation  fears,  and  no  informed  discussion  as  a 
country on how we really want our health care dollars spent. All of 
these  contribute  to  this  sense  of  “no  practical  choice”  for 
physicians  and  patients.  Without  choice  in  the  equation,  and  a 
huge  supply  of  sick  people,  frequently  desperate  and  not  even 
thinking  rationally,  whoever  controls  the  needed  healthcare 
commodities essentially has no limits on their market – the market 
economy fails entirely.148
1. Why Research Institutions are Ignored, but Still Important
The private, non-profit research hospitals and institutions 
located throughout the United States appear to be neglected 
because they are unique—providing both daily patient care 
and biotech research. Institutions such as the Mayo Clinic, 
the Cleveland Clinic, ARUP Laboratories, and Johns Hopkins 
Health  and  Medicine  Center,  among  others,  are  hybrids—
144
1
. E-mail  from  Rebecca  Eisenberg,  Robert  and  Barbara  Luciano 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to Caroline Crenshaw, J.D. Candidate, Univ. 
of Minn. (Jan 11, 2008, 10:28:00 EST) (on file with author) (“I don’t know of 
any  research  focusing  on  private  nonprofit  research  institutions  and  it 
sounds like it would be interesting to pursue . . . . I would not expect them 
to  differ  from other  patent  holders  with  respect  to  the  impact  of  their 
patents on patients . . . .”).
145 . “The current innovation system encourages researchers to patent 
and commercialize discoveries that in an earlier era were considered basic 
science insights. This has led to an active market in the building blocks of 
further research.” Goozner, supra note 20, at 0612.
146 . Eisenberg, supra note 144.
147 . See Lab. Corp. of Am., 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148 . McClure, supra note 18.
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part business, part pharmaceutical company, part university 
and  part  hospital—they  are  neither  pharmaceutical 
companies,  small  start-up firms,  nor  universities  (although 
some of them are attached to universities).149 Since profit is 
fundamental  to  funding  quality  facilities,  doctors’  salaries, 
and research,  these  enterprises  must  act  like  businesses; 
patient  fees  and  patenting  discoveries  become  financial 
necessities.  Any pecuniary  gain,  though,  is  funneled  back 
into the hospital.150 For example, “Mayo Clinic’s diversified 
activities include health information publishing enterprises, 
clinical  laboratory  reference  services,  technology 
commercialization, and other services and products that use 
Mayo’s  medical  and  scientific  knowledge  base.  These 
diversified activities generated $35 million in 2006, which is 
reinvested in Mayo Clinic programs in medical research and 
education.”151
Similarly, these clinics and labs act like pharmaceutical 
corporations  in  that  they  patent  their  discoveries  and 
research  tools  in  an  effort  to  protect  their  research  from 
exploitation.  These  institutions  also  are  like  universities. 
Their  research  is  designed  to  further  intellectual  curiosity 
and develop new technologies for patient care. Their general 
mission is wide dissemination of all possible research.152 Still, 
under  the  current  patent  system,  such  freedom  of 
information is clearly tempered by legal departments and a 
fear of litigation. For example, at the Cleveland Clinic:
Cleveland Clinic  Foundation Innovations was founded in 2000 to 
promote innovation and expand treatment of the sick through the 
deployment  of  Cleveland  Clinic  technology.  CCF  Innovations 
commercializes  new technologies  developed  at  Cleveland  Clinic, 
translating  emerging  therapies,  devices  and  diagnostics  into 
beneficial  medical  products  through spin-off  companies,  licenses 
and equity partnerships.  Under Cleveland Clinic conflict of interest 
policies,  these  transactions are subject to  review in advance by 
independent physician and trustee conflict of interest committees 
149
1
. See  generally The  Mayo  Clinic,  http://www.mayoclinic.com/  (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2007); The Cleveland Clinic, http://www.clevelandclinic.org/ 
(last  visited  Nov.  4,  2007);  ARUP  Laboratories,  http://www.aruplab.com/ 
(last  visited  Nov.  4,  2007);  Johns  Hopkins  Medicine. 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.  org/  (last  visited  Nov.  4,  2007)  (each 
describing the institutions, the patient care and the product and research 
developments).
150 . MAYO CLINIC, supra note 2, at 52.
151 . Id.
152 . See McClure, supra note 18.
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to ensure that they are ethical and consistent with Cleveland Clinic 
policies and legal requirements.  In addition, use of these products 
in  clinical  trials  is  subject  to  approval.  Use  of  these  medical 
products by Cleveland Clinic once they are commercialized is also 
subject to conflict of interest review.153
Although arguably non-profit research institutions need 
not fear litigation from pharmaceutical corporations and/or 
start-up biotech firms because of the patient-oriented nature 
of their work, this argument is not persuasive. Large, well-
known,  and  well-funded,  non-profit  research  institutions 
have faced  complex litigation  over  patent  infringement.154 
Unlike start-up businesses, which are underfunded and use 
relatively  small  numbers  of  patented  materials,  the  large 
institutions, because they are well-known, and because they 
use numerous research tools, are a prime target for patent 
infringement suits.  Like large businesses,  the likelihood of 
damage awards, even though the institutions are non-profit, 
is high.
Non-profits  also  suffer  because  “government  funded 
discoveries that pharmaceutical companies and universities 
feed off of is actually really cheap in most cases because the 
labor costs are almost free. This is because grad students do 
much of the grunt work.”155 Finally the non-profits, because 
they  are  private,  do  not  enjoy  state  university  sovereign 
immunity  protections.  State  universities,  it  seems,  have  a 
significant  and  unfair  advantage  in  the  patent  litigation 
game.
In summary, the private, non-profit research institutions 
do  not  belong  in  the  previously  examined  categories 
affected by the “tragedy of  the anticommons” and patent 
law.  Their  hybrid  business  system—research  guided  by 
patient care—is both served and hurt by the current patent 
system.  While  patents  bring  in  money  from  innovative 
techniques,  the  licensing  agreements  are  expensive  and 
time consuming for doctors. Nonetheless, the difficulties in 
obtaining  patents  are  unlikely  to  halt  research  at  these 
clinics,  since research  is  the  lifeblood of  their  exceptional 
patient  care.  The  non-profit  clinics  will  simply  hire  more 
153
1
. Cleveland  Clinic,  About  Us:  Integrity  in  Innovation,  http://www. 
clevelandclinic.org/aboutus/integrity.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
154 . See generally Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genetech,  927 
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir 1991); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 
F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
155 . McClure, supra note 18.
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lawyers to ensure the legality of all patents, both developed 
and  utilized.  Conversely,  start-ups  and  small  businesses 
could  well  be  forced  out-of-business  by  patent  costs.  The 
ultimate impact of these added costs and delays, though, is 
on  patients,  who  need  care,  and  doctors  involved  in 
diagnoses  and  treatment.  Doctors,  who  might  be  able  to 
develop a  cure or  drug for  a  patient  relatively  quickly  by 
changing  minute  aspects  of  some  research  tools  to 
correspond with patient needs, now are forced to delay their 
research,  pending  patent  review.  Ultimately,  non-profits 
suffer from the hybrid status:
Because good patient care requires a good interaction between the 
science and the clinic, it is not surprising that these hybrid models 
(such as Mayo and the others) are considered the best providers of 
medical  care in the country.  It  is difficult  to do only part  of  the 
whole  medical  field  in  isolation  and do it  well.  In  some specific 
areas  of  medical  testing,  the  result  is  that  much of  the  clinical 
testing, particularly the esoteric testing that includes much of the 
genetic  testing  embroiled  in  the  patent  issues,  is  actually 
concentrated  in  relatively  few  centers  in  the  United  States. 
Although patients may see their doctors in their home town, their 
specimens often travel to one of a few centers for testing. So, there 
are relatively few places footing the bill back to the businesses for 
their license fees/royalties and it is not distributed evenly across 
medical  care providers.  The providers  who are subjected to  the 
potential or real litigation will pass these costs back to the patients/
health care system. This situation is damaging for patients, as it 
makes the costs  for  the hybrid institutions appear higher.  Some 
health  care insurers  will  choose  cheaper  testing facilities,  which 
have  not  spent  the  time  and  money  in  quality  and  integrated 
results.  Whenever  substandard  care  is  given  to  patients,  it 
ultimately costs more (unnecessary or wrong tests and treatments, 
law suits). It is for these reasons that the good hybrid institutions 
can survive despite the odds against them—quality is always more 
cost  effective  in  the  end.  But  patients  caught  up  in  the 
inefficiencies  and  poor  care  resulting  from  the  apparent  cost 
inequities  triggered,  in  large  part,  by  these  patent  issues,  pay 
extra.156
It  would  behoove  NIH,  academics,  special  interest 
groups, Congress, and the courts to consider this aspect of 
the patent problem. In the interest of public policy, patients 
at  non-profit  research  institutions  should  not  be  harmed 
while  universities  and  start-up  biotech  firms  receive 
government funding and large corporations raise prices on 
156
1
. Id.
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pharmaceuticals. 157
D. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The courts have recognized that the patent process is 
long  and  expensive.158 To  improve  the  process  and  to 
promote  the  timely  entrance  of  generic  drugs  into  the 
market upon expiration of the patented name-brand drug, 
the  courts  allow  the  use  of  some  upstream  patented 
materials  in  the  research  and  development  process  in 
accordance  with  the  safe  harbor  provision.159 Yet,  the 
experimental use exception for both universities and private 
research  institutions  is  severely  limited.160 Consequently, 
while  the  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  is  adjudicating 
patentable material and Congress is trying to find a balance 
between  costs,  timeliness,  and  innovation,  the  courts,  at 
least in the realm of biotechnology, seem to be exacerbating 
the  public  policy  problem  and  costing  patients  time  and 
money.
By expanding the experimental use exception, which has 
been suggested but deemed dangerous to innovation,161 the 
courts  would  help  protect  patients  at  private,  non-profit 
research institutions. Since the courts opted to allow state 
universities to continue patent infringement without liability, 
it would make sense for the courts to consider allowing non-
profit  institutions  the  advantage  of  an  experimental  use 
exception. Doctors could use materials without the fear of 
liability  and  cost  of  obtaining  patented  research  tools. 
Further, it is unlikely that such exceptions would deter any 
research of these tools.  While the tools would not provide 
financial incentives themselves, end products would still be 
patentable.  Since  the  research  tools  are  necessary  for 
achieving the end product, it  is unlikely that innovation of 
these  tools  would  cease  significantly.162 Also,  if  an  end 
157
1
. Id.
158 . United States Patent and Trademark Office,  Answers to the most 
frequently asked kids’ questions about patents, trademarks and copyrights 
and  the  U.S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office,  USPTO  Kid’s  Page, 
http://www.uspto.  gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/kidprimer.html  (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2007).
159 . See Integra Lifesciences, 545 U.S. at 202.
160 . See Madey, 307 F.ed. 1351 at 1363.
161 . Mireles, supra note 4, at 214–16.
162 .Research  liability  for  patent  infringement:  In  light  of  the 
Federal  Circuit’s  2002 ruling  that  even  noncommercial  scientific 
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product  ultimately  succeeded  and  proliferated,  the 
companies  could  ask  for  royalties.  Therefore,  the  courts 
should consider fostering a new relationship between patent 
use and biotechnology. This new balance must consider the 
large number of patients served and the purpose of the non-
profit research institutions, which are seemingly ignored in 
the “tragedy of the anticommons” debate. Leading research 
institutions  serving  more  than  500,000  patients  annually 
should be able to treat  all  patients at the lowest possible 
costs.163 Increased patient costs lead to increased insurance 
rates, which ultimately impact society at large, not just the 
patients visiting these institutions. It seems logical, then, to 
consider the needs of these institutions when establishing a 
new course for the patent system.
Another popular suggestion that seems possible for the 
courts  to  utilize  on  behalf  of  non-profit,  medical  research 
facilities  is  the  oft-discussed  patent  pool.  Multinational 
companies like IBM, Sony and Nokia are attempting to set up 
a patent pool “for companies to donate intellectual property 
that improves the environment.”164  In this patent pool each 
company  will  donate  patents  to  the  pool,  which  can  be 
research  enjoys  no protection  from patent  infringement  liability, 
and in view of  the academic research community’s  belief  in  the 
existence of such an exemption, and behavior accordingly, there 
should  be  some  level  of  protection  for  noncommercial  uses  of 
patented  inventions.  Congress  should  consider  appropriately 
narrow legislation, but if progress is slow or delayed the Office of 
Management  and  Budget  and  the  federal  government  agencies 
sponsoring research should consider extending ‘authorization and 
consent’  to  grantees  as  well  as  contractors,  provided  that  such 
rights  are strictly  limited to  research and do not  extend to  any 
resulting  commercial  products  or  services.  Either  legislation  or 
administrative  action  could  help  ensure  preservation  of  the 
‘commons’ required for scientific and technological progress.
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.) (2004).
163
1
.Unlike software or even agricultural biotechnology—where the 
end products are relatively low cost, and the costs of development 
are  relatively  evenly  distributed  throughout  the  development 
process—biomedical research costs escalate once a therapeutically 
useful product reaches clinical trials. Applied research can take five 
to ten years from the start of human safety experiments. While the 
costs of pharmaceutical research are less than the drug industry 
claims,  the  investment  required  can  run  into  the  tens  of  even 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars.  As  a  result  this  developmental 
research has almost always been funded by the private sector.
Goozner, supra note 20, at 0613.
164 . William M. Bulkeley, Companies to Share Eco-Friendly Patents, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008 at B2.
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utilized  without  regard  to  patent  liability.  “We’re  pledging 
that  we  won’t  assert  the  patents  that  are  put  into  the 
commons  against  anyone  who  is  using  them  in  an 
environmentally  friendly  way.”165 Major  corporations  are 
working  together  to  advocate  for  the  environment  and 
solving problems through varying patent schemes. A similar 
device could help biotechnology research. 
The federal government also might be able to intervene 
for  non-profits  if  it  recognizes  the  problems  at  these 
institutions.  For  example,  as  the  government  seeks  to 
protect  the  public  from  the  Avian  Flu,  it  has  forced 
pharmaceutical  companies  to  sell  some  exclusive  patents 
and allow other corporations to develop and market  a flu 
vaccine.166 The government issued “compulsory licenses to 
other  drug  companies  to  manufacture  generic  versions  of 
the  drug.  Such  option  is  available  to  countries  under  the 
Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  (TRIPS) 
Agreement,  a  component  of  the  treaties  that  created  the 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  in  1995.”167 The 
government,  then,  has  the  power  to  ensure  that  there  is 
enough vaccine and that it  is  affordable to citizens in the 
United  States  and  abroad.  If  it  addresses  the  non-profit 
problem, the government might  find a similar  solution for 
non-profit  research  institutions  and  ease  some  of  their 
patent law and biotech research problems. Finally, the Court 
could  re-evaluate  its  definition  of  patentable  material  and 
fashion a clear definition for patentable biological materials.
CONCLUSION
There is a significant amount of research and legislation 
regarding the balance between patent law and innovation. 
While  most  industries  simply  pass  along  the  costs  of 
protecting innovation to the consumers, who can choose to 
purchase the product or not, the biotechnology field differs. 
In  terms  of  pharmaceutical  corporations,  doctors  and 
hospitals can choose to buy new, innovative drugs or use old 
ones. Patients, however, who seek out new treatments and 
state-of-the-art care and procedures, particularly patients at 
the private, non-profit institutions, are often suffering from 
165
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. Id.
166 . YEH, INFLUENZA, supra note 9, at summary.
167 . Id.
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life-threatening illnesses. These patients have no alternative 
choices; they rely on the expensive techniques used at these 
clinics.  Unfortunately,  prices  are  rising  at  these  clinics 
because  of  increased  patent  protection  and  decreased 
freedom of information.  The courts are limiting exceptions 
that  these  institutions  historically  relied  upon  to  avoid 
passing  on  costs  to  patients.  Congress  is  changing  the 
patent  laws,  but  it  appears  to  be  ignoring  the  non-profit 
research institutions and their patients.
In a society where innovation and technological change 
continue  unabated,  but  where  medical  costs  continue  to 
skyrocket, it is necessary to review the nation’s patent laws 
and their impact on biotechnology from a perspective other 
than  that  of  the  pharmaceutical  companies  and  patent 
attorneys.  Doctors,  who  are  busy  caring  for  patients  and 
developing  treatments,  have  little  time  to  propose  new 
patent laws, but they need to be consulted. Costs and delays 
incurred by patients must be quantified. Private institutions 
must suggest policy changes, such as limiting the amount of 
time a diagnostic approach is protected under patent law, 
without  being  subject  to  criticism  from  pharmaceutical 
companies, start-up groups, universities, and academics.
Although NIH has performed a few studies that focus on 
the problem, the nation would benefit from a closer look at 
the  number  of  patients  harmed,  how  much  costs  have 
increased,  and the  number  of  doctors  and researchers  at 
these research institutions who have been frustrated as a 
result of the current patent system. The negative impact on 
patients may ultimately prove less severe than thought, but 
it is clear that patent law in biotechnology is different from 
patent  law  in  other  fields.  Policies,  laws,  and  court 
interpretations  in  biotechnological  research  and 
development need to evolve and take into consideration the 
public at large, rather than simply the impact on innovation. 
It  is  unlikely  that  the  writers  of  the  Constitution  foresaw 
modern  health  care  techniques.  It  seems  equally  unlikely 
that  the  Constitutional  protection  for  innovation  and 
commercialization in capitalist markets was meant to punish 
patients and limit health care quality and accessibility.
